312-50 ยท System hacking
Cracking tools and Windows credential stores
Hashcat modes, John the Ripper, Hydra, SAM and NTDS.dit, LM/NTLM/Kerberos basics, pass-the-hash, Kerberoasting at concept level.
Key points
- Hashcat (GPU) -m: 0 MD5, 1000 NTLM, 3000 LM, 3200 bcrypt, 13100 Kerberos TGS-REP etype 23; -a: 0 straight, 3 mask, 6/7 hybrid.
- John the Ripper (--wordlist, --format, --show): offline. Hydra: online.
- SAM: local hashes. NTDS.dit (domain controllers): domain hashes.
- Pass-the-hash: reuses an NTLM hash uncracked.
- Kerberoasting: tickets of SPN accounts, cracked offline.
- Defenses: long random service passwords, gMSA, LAPS, LM/NTLM off.
Source: https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes
Practice questions
Which Hashcat hash mode number corresponds to NTLM?
- 0
- 1000
- 3000
- 3200
Show answer
Answer: B. 1000
Mode 1000 is NTLM. Mode 0 is MD5, 3000 is LM and 3200 is bcrypt.
Which statements about Windows credential stores are correct?
- The SAM stores hashes of local accounts
- NTDS.dit stores hashes of domain accounts on domain controllers
- The SAM stores all Active Directory domain hashes
- NTDS.dit stores passwords in plaintext by design
- The SAM stores issued Kerberos tickets
Show answer
Answer: A. The SAM stores hashes of local accounts, B. NTDS.dit stores hashes of domain accounts on domain controllers
The SAM holds local account hashes; NTDS.dit on a domain controller holds all domain account hashes. Neither stores plaintext passwords by design, and Kerberos tickets are not kept in the SAM.
True or false: Kerberoasting requires the attacker to be a domain administrator.
Show answer
Answer: False
False. Any authenticated domain user can request a service ticket for an account with an SPN; the ticket is then cracked offline. That is why weak service-account passwords are dangerous.
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