312-50 ยท Denial-of-service
What are SYN cookies and how do they stop SYN floods?
Rate limiting, SYN cookies, ingress/egress filtering, blackholing, scrubbing, CDNs, WAFs, and detection techniques.
Key points
- SYN cookies: a server-side defense against SYN floods (RFC 4987).
- No state is stored for half-open connections.
- Connection details are encoded in the sequence number of the SYN-ACK.
- No memory is allocated until a valid final ACK returns.
- Fake SYNs cannot exhaust the connection-state table, since nothing is stored for connections that never complete.
Source: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4987
Practice questions
What does ingress filtering, as defined in RFC 2827 (BCP 38), primarily defeat?
- DoS attacks that rely on spoofed source IP addresses
- SQL injection against web applications
- Credential stuffing against login pages
- Cross-site scripting in user-submitted content
Show answer
Answer: A. DoS attacks that rely on spoofed source IP addresses
RFC 2827 defines ingress filtering as a router dropping any packet whose source address falls outside the prefixes its customer legitimately owns, which directly defeats DoS attacks that rely on spoofed source IP addresses.
Which of the following are documented DoS/DDoS countermeasures?
- Rate limiting requests per client
- SYN cookies on the server's TCP stack
- Ingress filtering of spoofed source addresses
- Disabling all security logging
- Removing all firewall rules
Show answer
Answer: A. Rate limiting requests per client, B. SYN cookies on the server's TCP stack, C. Ingress filtering of spoofed source addresses
Rate limiting, SYN cookies, and ingress filtering (RFC 2827/BCP 38) are all documented, real countermeasures against DoS/DDoS. Disabling all logging and removing firewall rules are the opposite of a countermeasure and would weaken defenses.
Ingress filtering (RFC 2827 / BCP 38) stops all DoS floods, including ones launched from valid, unspoofed source addresses within the permitted prefix range.
Show answer
Answer: False
False. RFC 2827 itself states that ingress filtering does nothing against floods launched from genuinely valid source addresses; it only defeats attacks that rely on spoofed addresses outside the customer's legitimate prefixes.
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